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[Essay] 
If Goldfish Give Us Meaning in Life, What’s Next? 




In her widely influential and popular book Meaning in Life and Why It Matters, Susan Wolf formulates 
a hybrid theory of our ability to have meaning in life. She originally argues, meaning in life arises 
from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way. I show that Wolf ends 
up crucially shifting her view from this original version to a revised version that she presents in her 
response to Nomy Arpaly and Johnathan Haidt’s commentaries. Following this, I argue Wolf’s 
account of meaning in life has very serious, possibly irrevocable, flaws because it structurally allows 




Susan Wolf’s hybrid theory of “meaning in life” as outlined in Meaning in 
Life and Why It Matters aims to combine elements from objective theories of 
meaning in life and subjective or attitude-dependent theories of meaning in life.1 
Objective theories see meaning in life as being grounded in the actions one 
performs or the activities one participates in that promote “the greater good.” 
Subjective or attitude-dependent theories, on the other hand, see meaning in life 
as being grounded in the attitudes of satisfaction or fulfillment that one derives 
from activities they engage in or, more generally, their life at large. So understood, 
Wolf’s hybrid theory combines elements from both objective and subjective 
theories to suggest that meaning in life is grounded in one’s engagement with 
activities that are (i) subjectively satisfying and (ii) are objectively valuable in a 
positive way. On that note, this paper has two aims that will be divided 
correspondingly into two sections. In section one, I will focus on sketching a 
crucial shift in Wolf’s hybrid theory that I believe she commits herself to in the 
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appendix of the book. Following this, in section two I will raise some objections 
to this revised version of the hybrid theory and conclude with some brief 
comments on the implications for Wolf’s view.  
 
1. A Change in View  
 
In this section, I will attempt to draw an outline of the account of “meaning in 
life” that Susan Wolf gives in her lectures. I am going to show that Wolf ends up 
shifting her view from this original version to a revised version that she presents 
in her response to Nomy Arpaly and Johnathan Haidt’s commentaries. First, 
however, a few preliminary remarks are in order. I want to set up the scene by 
calling attention to how Wolf begins by framing her view against the background 
of two long-standing philosophical models of rationality. According to the first 
model, people act rationally only insofar as their actions are grounded in their own 
self-interest. Conversely, the second model holds that people act rationally only 
insofar as they do what is best from a strictly moral perspective. By most standards, 
I think, these two models are quite popular, but Wolf contends that they alone are 
not enough to adequately describe human motivation and practical reason. In fact, 
she says they leave out many of the motives and reasons that are most important 
and central to our lives. Consider for example common cases such as when we 
visit a family member in the hospital or stay up all night working hard on a 
philosophy paper. Here, Wolf thinks, it would be mistaken to say that our actions 
are grounded in self-interest or moral reasons, because we are neither maximizing 
our own welfare by doing them, nor are we duty-bound to perform them. 2 
Moreover, it seems odd to say that in such cases our behavior is unjustified in 
terms of our motives and practical reason. Thus, Wolf suggests that in these cases 
and others like them we act on reasons of love (i.e., acting for the sake of the loved 
person, object, or ideal, or simply because the actor loves what it is they are acting 
for), which correspondingly serve as an ingredient for meaning in one’s life.  
Still, Wolf makes it a point to show that not all cases where our actions are 
grounded in reasons of love does meaningfulness come to play a role, there are 
conditions that limit what contributes to meaning in one’s life. According to her, 
“meaning arises from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a 
                                                     
2 This isn’t to suggest that moral reasons to perform a given action only amounts to whether or not 
there is a duty to do so.  
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positive way.”3 This characterization of Wolf’s view, however, is very not very 
detailed and overlooks some important aspects. With that being said, I want to try 
to formulate her view as follows: 
 
Original version. A life with meaning in it is one that (i) subjects 
find fulfilling, (ii) contributes to or connects passionately with some 
person, object, or ideal, x, such that x has objective value (OV) 
outside of the subject, and (iii) that x is the thing that gives rise to the 
subject’s fulfillment. 
 
Now, there is a lot to unpack here, so let’s begin. For one thing we have these 
vague notions of “fulfillment” and “objective value outside of the subject” present 
in our formulation of the Original version that need to be made clear. For Wolf, a 
subject’s fulfillment just is “the feelings one has when one loves, or when one is 
engaging in activities by which one is gripped or excited.”4 As for the second 
concern, the notion of a person, object, or ideal having objective value outside the 
subject is merely used by Wolf to avoid a radically subjective account of value. 
Otherwise, Wolf’s proposal is, as it stands, pretty straightforward and we need not 
spend too much time on it. I do wish to acknowledge that something seems right 
about the account justifying those common cases—like visiting a family member 
in the hospital or staying up all night to write a philosophy paper—in terms of 
practical reason. 
Although it has this appealing consequence, the Original version isn’t very 
strong as it stands. Arpaly raises the worry that the Original version provides an 
objectionable result when given an easily imaginable case of a mentally disabled 
child that is positively engaged with caring for his pet goldfish and who finds the 
very activity to be fulfilling. As Wolf expresses throughout her lectures, she takes 
caring for a pet goldfish to be a paradigm instance of when an activity does not 
meet the conditions necessary to give rise to fulfillment.5 At least she thinks this 
is true for normal adults. However, according to Arpaly, “in caring for the fish, 
the child, unlike the adult, may well be working at the edge of his abilities, giving 
himself challenges and reasons to feel pride… a beloved goldfish or two can give 
                                                     
3 See note 1, p. 8.  
4 See note 1, p. 14.  
5 As Wolf’s own discussion renders clear, this is because she does not take caring for a pet goldfish as 
being an activity in which the subject contributes to or connects passionately with some person, object, 
or ideal, that has positive objective value. 
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the [mentally disabled] child a measure of fulfillment that would require much 
bigger projects in a normal adult…”6 Given this, if one embraces the Original 
version along with Wolf’s assumptions about the objective value in caring for a 
pet goldfish, then it must follow that the imagined mentally disabled child is not 
doing something which contributes to meaning in life. However, it seems clear 
from Wolf’s discussion following this objection that she feels this is an issue her 
account ought to accommodate.7 Following a worry of this sort, both Arpaly and 
Haidt suggest that the Original version is too restrictive in this way. For them, an 
account of meaning in life should focus on the subject’s fulfillment as meeting 
psychological needs and the exercise of human capacities, rather than place so 
much weight on the objective value of the person, object, or ideal that the subject 
engages with when determining meaning in one’s life. 
Of course, I am certainly not the first to think Wolf shifts her view when she 
responds to these objections in the appendix of the book. Frances Kamm also 
notices this and says, “[Wolf] hypothesizes that [(i)] it is the exercise of whatever 
capacities one has to the highest extent and [(ii)] the opportunity this gives for 
interacting with others that may create objective value in that to which one is 
attracted.”8 At a minimum, (ii) seems right, however, I want to suggest that (i) is 
an incorrect interpretation of what Wolf says. In fact, she can even be found saying, 
“Haidt’s and Arpaly’s discussions of human psychology are insightful and 
instructive, with interesting implications, I believe for the [Original version]. Still, 
I believe there are reasons to resist using their insights to defend a fulfillment view 
of meaning that is independent to any reference of objective value.”9 This is to 
say, that she wants to hold on to (iii), or something like it, from the Original 
version despite what might seem like pressure for her to reconsider. In an attempt 
to offset all these worries, she gives, at least implicitly, a revised version that I 
will try to formulate as follows: 
 
                                                     
6 See note 1, p. 89. 
7 “Although Haidt and Arpaly offered their examples (of the horse-loving student and goldish-loving 
disabled child) as challenges to the idea that meaningfulness need be understood as essentially connected 
to objective value, I see their examples as offering hints about where the objective value might be found 
and how it can emerge. By understanding their examples in this way we can not only acknowledge the 
plausibility of their assessments, but explain what makes them so effective.” Wolf, op. cit., p. 130. 
8 Frances Kamm, Almost Over, (unpublished manuscript). From Ch. 6 of her forthcoming book on death, 
dying, and public policy.   
9 See note 1, p. 120. 
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Revised version. A life with meaning in it is one that (i) subjects 
find fulfilling (ii) contributes to, or connects passionately with, some 
person, object, or ideal, x, such that x has objective value (OV) 
outside of the subject. (iii) Furthermore, there is a continuum of OV 
along which the OV of engaging with x can lie (e.g., building 
relationships, communion that comes from shared activity, 
cultivation and exercise of skills and virtues, etc.) and (iv) the whole 
or overall sum of those engagements the subject has, rather than x 
itself, is what gives rise to the fulfillment. 
 
So, what has changed? Well, let me emphasize an important difference between 
the Original version and the Revised version. Because Wolf adopts a new notion 
of there being “a continuum of value” along which the value of engaging with a 
person, object, or ideal can lie, the Revised version can account for those problems 
raised by Arpaly and Haidt. Without pretending that I have fully captured what is 
meant by this, I wish to say more to ensure there is clarity here. One simple way 
put to it, is that, by “continuum of value” Wolf means the network of valuable 
activities around the person, object, or ideal that the subject engages with—call 
them “associated values,” if you will—and as I hinted above these include things 
like refinement of skills or friendships made through the subject’s engagement. 
So then, on the Revised version, if the mentally disabled child who finds 
fulfillment in caring for a goldfish is engaged with other children who come to 
see the fish and rapport is achieved with his parents who help him care for it, then 
even if those engagements are associated with what Wolf would have described 
as an activity that has no objective value (the caring for a goldfish) on the Original 
version, they are still valuable and give the child meaning in life.  
In any case, it might be suggested that this shift is actually more problematic 
then helpful for Wolf’s account of “meaning in life,” and in the next section, I will 
discuss why I think this is so. 
 
2. Problems with the Revised version and My Worries 
 
As mentioned above and hinted at by the title of this section, I wish to discuss 
my worries that arise as a result of the shift to the Revised version and problems 
with Susan Wolf’s account of “meaning in life” as a whole. In what follows, I’ll 
largely be concerned with the question of what is allowed to count as giving 
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meaning to one’s life as a consequence of this revision.  
First, an important proviso: when looking at a theoretical level, the kind of 
objective value that some person, object, or ideal can have tends to be sorted into 
three general categories, that is, positive, negative, and neutral. As should have 
already been made clear by our discussion in section one, Wolf’s account of 
“meaning in life” has always held that, other things considered, if the person, 
object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged has an objective value that is 
positive, then this gives the subject meaning in life.10 This changed with the shift 
to the Revised version, because now the account allows for the person, object, or 
ideal with which the subject is engaged to have an objective value that is neutral 
(e.g., caring for a pet goldfish) or be what Wolf would more recently refer to as 
“good-for-nothing.”11 I am inclined to think, however, that even in these good-
for-nothing cases such as caring for a pet goldfish, meaning in life is still 
determined, other things considered, by the positive objective value of those 
things within the network of valuable activities associated with the goldish (e.g., 
the friendships made with the other children who come visit to see the goldfish). 
If that analysis is right, namely, that on the Revised version engagement with 
good-for-nothings can give the subject meaning in life, albeit in a somewhat 
indirect way, and that process rests on the main contributors of meaning in life to 
be within the network of activities having positive objective value that are merely 
associated with the good-for-nothings, then I think this account begins to crumble. 
My point is that, in that case, the shift from the Original version to the Revised 
version just represents a shift from the subject previously having to be 
passionately connected with a person, object, or ideal that had in itself positive 
objective value in order to have meaning in life, to now, the subject only having 
to be passionately connected with associated values which have positive objective 
value. That is, so long as the whole or overall sum of the engagements the subject 
has (i.e. the objective value of the person, object, or ideal itself with which the 
subject is engaged plus the associated values) is positive, then the subject has 
                                                     
10 By “other things considered” I mean that given those subjective components (i.e., the subject being 
connected passionately with some person, object, or ideal they choose to engage with and find it 
fulfilling), we can speak of the objective component as being met in such a way. Further, I want to note 
that what I am saying here is, on the Original version, meaning in life is determined (other things 
considered) by the subject’s engagement with some person, object, or ideal, that has positive objective 
value outside of the subject. 
11 Susan Wolf, “Good-for-Nothings” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association, Vol. 85 (2010): pp. 47-64. 
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meaning in life.12 
While this might not seem problematic when we’re only dealing with a 
hypothetical mentally disabled child who finds fulfillment in caring for his 
goldfish, when we further consider the consequences of what has been said above, 
the account seems, at least to me, beyond repair. The idea, roughly, is that if the 
account permits the network of activities with positive objective value to be the 
sole contributor in the event of the subject’s engagement with good-for-nothings, 
then it seems required to permit the network of activities with positive objective 
value to be the sole contributor in the event of the subject’s engagement with what 
I will call bad-for-someones.13 More specifically, this will structurally allow for 
Nazis to be doing something that contributes to meaning in their lives when they 
help out with the Nazi bake sale to raise money for their annual vandalism night, 
because they’ll be passionately connected to friendships and have shared 
communal activities (of which, generally on this view have positive objective 
value) along the way.14 Again, that is so long as the whole or overall sum of their 
engagements produce a positive objective value. Ultimately, this raises an 
interesting question: can an individual who is objectively bad have meaning in 
life? As I have expressed, it immediately seems that there is something 
disqualifying about objectively bad individuals having meaning in life, especially 
in an extreme counterexample like the one I just presented where the individuals 
are Nazis.15 However, I anticipate that insofar as one embraces Wolf’s Revised 
version, there are two possible ways they might respond to this concern. 
                                                     
12 It bears emphasizing that the model for representing evaluations of meaning in life on the Revised 
version assigns “parthood” relations to the person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged 
and to each of things that make up the associated values. From this, it seems natural to elucidate the 
model using a framework of additivism or atomism to derive the sum of those values. At any rate, Wolf’s 
shift in view now presents a picture where meaning in life is determined (other things considered) by a 
positive (in terms of value) sum of those things holding a parthood relation. (Sill it’s difficult to assert 
what exactly the parthood relation is in relation to, for our purposes let’s just call it x, and what exactly 
is a “part,” or can be a “part” of, x. Nevertheless, this need not concern us in advancing the discussion). 
For more see Campbell Brown, “Two Kinds of Holism About Values” in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 57 (2007): pp. 456-463. 
13 By “bad-for-someones” I mean to refer to those cases where the person, object, or ideal with which 
the subject is engaged has an objective value that is negative (e.g., what most of the middle ages 
consisted of in Europe). 
14 Please do not take me to be saying the Nazi’s communal activities has positive objective value. All I 
meant here was that the general events of building friendships and shared communal activities have 
positive objective value. Also, I will later reference this imagined scenario as the Nazi bake sale example. 
15 Perhaps it’s worth addressing the objection that some readers make at this point. That is, any person, 
object, or ideal related to Nazism has an objective value so negative that realistically, no amount of 
objectively positive associated values could ever make the whole or overall sum of the subject’s 
engagements produce a positive objective value (see Landau, 2011; Campbell & Nyholm, 2015). Even 
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First, defenders of the Revised version might try to retreat by claiming it’s 
fallacious to assume the governing function of the account is based on an atomistic 
model of value holism—i.e., representing (for our purposes) evaluations of 
meaning in life by the sum of independent values without factoring in 
considerations for “interaction effects.” 16  That is when combined, those 
associated positive objective values offered in the above scenario with the Nazis 
actually contribute, all things considered, to the overall disvalue or badness of the 
case. In fact, I quite agree with those defenders that it may be, crudely put, “bad 
philosophy” to hastily make assumptions about what model the governing 
function of any account is based on. But, as far as I can see, their complaint has 
little force and will not provide them with the resources to avoid Wolf’s account 
from crumbling. After all, if one decides to pursue this anticipated retreat it 
remains necessary for them to reconfigure the Revised version with an alternative 
model that represents evaluations of whole values in terms of the composition of 
their part values. But my sense is that, even if this is accomplished, various 
unaddressed concerns still interfere with the Revised version being a 
philosophically satisfying account of meaning in life.  
For one thing, suppose we stipulate that the Revised version’s governing 
function is based on a sort of value holism supported by G.E. Moore or Jonathan 
Dancy where the contextual value of parts plays a critical role in representing 
evaluations of whole values. In this way, the Revised version would be able to 
offer a satisfying response to the Nazi counterexample, namely, that those 
associated positive objective values actually contribute, all things considered, to 
the overall disvalue or badness of the case. Call this the Revised version*. But, as 
                                                     
if that is so, I feel there are other less-extreme cases, one of which I will soon offer, where we could 
reasonably conceive of the person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged having a negative 
objective value that, when conjoined with objectively positive associated values, could allow for the 
whole or overall sum of the subject’s engagements to produce a positive objective value. 
16 To illustrate this point, consider the following example offered by Campbell Brown: “As the opinions 
of competent judges will attest, gravy complements chips, yet spoils ice-cream. That is, chips with gravy 
is better than chips alone, but ice-cream with gravy is worse than ice-cream alone. On an ‘atomistic’ 
view of value, these judgements are puzzling. The sole difference between chips with gravy and chips 
alone is the gravy. So any difference in value between these two must be the value of the gravy. But just 
the same is true of ice-cream with gravy and ice-cream alone: the only difference is the gravy, and so 
any difference in value must be the value of the gravy. The difference in value between the first pair is, 
therefore, the same as that between the second pair. In particular, chips with gravy is better than chips 
alone if and only if ice-cream with gravy is better than ice-cream alone.” Brown, op. cit., p. 1. In short, 
the response from loyal advocates of Wolf’s Revised version can be seen as claiming that the Nazi bake 
sale objection I raised doesn’t take into consideration that there might be an “interaction effect” between 
values as there is with ice-cream and gravy. 
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I hinted at before, the Nazi bake sale case is an extreme counterexample and of 
course there are other less-extreme cases. For example, suppose there’s a farmer 
who spends his entire adult life slaughtering cattle. (For our purposes and because 
it’s a matter of huge debate, let’s say that slaughtering cattle is a type of harm and 
hence a bad-for-someone case).17 Suppose that the farmer does this in order to 
provide food for his family and that he also donates the additional meat to those 
in need during the holidays making him a valued and respected member of his 
community. 18  Intuitively, this might appear to be a bad-for-someone with a 
significant amount of associated objectively positive goods that should contribute 
to meaning in the individual’s life, however, I think we ought to reject this 
inference or at least be very suspicious of it. Right off the bat, it appears unclear 
how the Revised version* would, all things considered, represent an evaluation of 
meaning in life for the cattle farmer—do the associated positive objective values 
here also contribute to the overall badness of the case? Based on what Wolf has 
said in the past about moral saints19, it may be that in this particular scenario she 
does not see the contribution from the negative elements in the cattle farmer’s 
engagement as being a matter of concern for meaning in life.20 Notice, however, 
that this would mark a significant departure from what she originally wished to 
claim in Meaning in Life and Why It Matters, namely, that “an individual cannot 
get meaning from worthless projects, much less from projects of wholly negative 
                                                     
17 I suppose on the traditional use of the word a cow isn’t a “someone.” In that event, one could refer to 
these this case as a bad-for-some-being case. See Harman, 2011; 2015, for debate on whether on not 
killing animals for farming practices constitutes a harm.  
18  This example came from Danny Underwood in comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
Additionally, John Partridge brought to my attention a possible real-life instance of the cattle farmer 
example. Dario Cecchini, a world-renowned Italian butcher from the Chianti region of Italy, was 
previously on a path to become a Veterinarian before he left university to take over the family business 
from his dying father. In doing so, he became the eighth generation of Cecchini butchers. Now, I’m not 
sure Cecchini donates leftover meat to those in need during the holidays the above example describes, 
but he is certainly a well-respected member of his community and, for that matter, the more global 
cooking community. His mission is to protect and advocate for the local butcher against the rise of 
powerful supermarkets and moreover, serve as a teacher and educator. These could considerably be 
associated positive objective values.   
19 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints” in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79 (1982): pp. 419-439. 
20 Frances Kamm pointed out to me that the cattle farmer case might be particularly interesting here 
since it seems to be a case of compensation. That is, by donating his spare product to the needy and 
serving as a valued and respected member of his community, the cattle farmer is attempting to 
compensate for his engagement in an immoral activity. Perhaps that’s why it intuitively seems as if this 
is a bad-for-someone with a significant amount of associated objectively positive goods that should (or 
at least could) contribute to meaning in life. At any rate, another question that might be worth asking is 
how something like compensation, sacrifice, or other contexts weigh on the all things considered value 
of an immoral action, activity, or what have you.   
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value.”21 At the very least, it seems evident that the cattle farmer scenario raises 
concerns that require further consideration. 
The second way I anticipate defenders of the Revised version (and also 
Revised version*) might respond to the issues that arise from the Nazi bake sale 
case (and the cattle farmer scenario just outlined) is by positing anti-meaning as 
part of the model’s conceptual framework. That is, one could suggest that 
meaningfulness is not monopolar and in fact has a negative pole that represents 
adding something of distinctly negative value to one’s life. In this way, Nazi bake 
sale people would be engaged in an activity that substantially weighs against 
whatever contributions to meaning in life they might have had from the positive 
associated values. Although this accounts for the Nazi bake sale case, I find this 
response to face the same issue as the first response. More specifically, it still 
remains unclear how the account would represent an all things considered 
evaluation of meaning in life for the cattle farmer—is he engaged in an activity 
that, like the Nazi bake sale people, substantially weighs against the contributions 
to meaning in life that stem from the positive associated values? As before, the 
cattle farmer case intuitively appears to be a bad-for-someone with a significant 
amount of associated objectively positive goods that should (or at least could) 
contribute to meaning in life. But, as before too, if the contribution from the 
associated values can offset the anti-meaning that stems from the negative 
elements in the in the cattle farmer’s engagement, then there clearly has been a 
departure from what Wolf says about “projects of wholly negative value.”  
Assuming that there is a solution to the foregoing concerns I have raised, the 
Revised version* stands to completely fly in the face of what Wolf seems to say, 
at least implicitly, about what I will refer to as Gauguin cases.22 These are 
scenarios where an individual contributes to, or connects passionately with, some 
person, object, or ideal, that has positive objective value outside of the subject, 
but meanwhile, also is engaged with a network of associated activities that have 
negative objective value. Wolf makes it clear when discussing the scorned artist 
and lonely inventor on the Original version that it’s not a necessary condition for 
there to be a network of associated values in order for the subject to attain meaning 
in life. Against this background, when analyzing Gauguin cases on the Original 
                                                     
21 See note 1, p. 60 
22 So called because of Bernard Williams’ discussion of Gauguin in his essay on moral luck. As the 
story goes, Gauguin abandoned his family in Denmark and isolated himself to pursue art in Paris, hence, 
he aptly represents an individual in the kind of scenario I want to draw on here. 
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version Wolf would have considered an individual—one such as Paul Gauguin—
to have meaning in life. However, given the above discussion of the shift in her 
view to the Revised version and the anticipated responses to the Nazi bake sale 
counterexample that brings to attention the Revised version*, analyzing Gauguin 
cases in the same way as before becomes extremely problematic. To reinforce this 
picture, reflect on how a value holism that takes into account the contextual value 
of parts in the evaluations of whole values—a G.E. Moore and/or Jonathan Dancy 
value holism—would parse these Gauguin cases. According to this way of 
theorizing, the model would likely represent an evaluation of a “Gauguin scenario” 
as a negative whole value, since considerably, it’s just the reverse of the 
aforementioned Nazi bake sale example. By this, I mean to point out that, in the 
latter, the person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged has a negative 
objective value and the associated values are positive, while in the former, the 
person, object, or ideal with which the subject is engaged has a positive objective 
value and the associated values are negative. So understood, they are switched. 
But, unlike the Nazi bake sale example, Wolf previously seemed committed to 
the idea that an individual like Gauguin would be making a contribution to 
meaning in their life.  
Summing up, if some of what I have argued turns out to not to hit the mark, it 
nevertheless seems evident that Wolf or her supporters need to address the 
concerns I’ve presented in order for the revised hybrid theory to be a 
philosophically satisfying account of meaning in life. On the other hand, if what 
I have argued hitherto does hit the mark, then Wolf’s account has very serious, 
possibly irrevocable, flaws. To say more about why I consider these to be 
“possibly irrevocable flaws,” recall from our earlier discussion that the shift from 
the Original version to the Revised version required a reconfiguration of the 
hybrid theory such that it included a model for representing evaluations of whole 
values in terms of the composition of their part values. Through that process, the 
worries against atomism in the form of the Nazi bake sale case led us to invoke 
value holism in the Revised version*, but, as I see it, this won’t suffice for a theory 
of meaning in life.  
The first point to note is that having meaning in life is generally seen as 
something that (all else being equal) makes one better-off and renders their life 
more desirable to have. To put it another way, meaning in life is generally seen as 
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a prudential good.23 Given that, ideally a theory of meaning in life will be able to 
inform our decision making, that is, insofar as we wish to make ourselves better-
off. In order to do this, a theory needs to be able to provide consistent evaluations 
in the form of meaning in life judgments. Drawing a connection to the examples 
presented earlier, that means a theory needs to be able to provide a single meaning 
in life judgement for each of the individuals in the above cases, more specifically, 
the goldfish owner, the Nazi bake sale people, the cattle farmer, and Paul Gaugin. 
As it turns out, both the Revised version and Revised version* won’t meet this 
criteria. On both of those versions, the objective value of an individual’s 
engagement with some person, object, or ideal, x, considered as a whole depends 
on the values of its parts, namely, the objective value of x and the associated 
values, which allows for multiple meaning in life judgements to be available for 
cases like the cattle farmer and Paul Gaugin. That is to say, in both of those 
examples, a story where the sum of the parts forms a whole with positive objective 
value can just as easily be told as a story where the sum of the parts forms a whole 
with negative objective value.24 At any rate, the bottom line is this: a theory of 
meaning in life that provides contradictory evaluations based on the same case 
information is not a philosophically satisfying theory and can’t inform our 
decision making as it relates to achieving meaning in life or making our lives 
prudentially more valuable.  
As for what an alternative account might look like in that case, I am still 
unsure. Rather, this paper has more so aimed to illuminate a negative result of not 
only Wolf’s Revised version/Revised version* but also her account of “meaning 
in life” as a whole.25  
                                                     
23 See Campbell, 2013; Campbell & Nyholm, 2015; Metz, 2013. Using different terms, Metz suggests 
that meaningfulness is what Tim Scanlon would call a personal good—i.e., “[a] condition that makes 
and individual person’s existence better or worse and so…in a broad sense ‘good for’ one (cf. p. 62).”  
24 With respect to Paul Gaugin on the Revised version*, one could plausibly say that while there is some 
negative OV from the associated values, there is much more positive OV from the art that he is engaged 
in and, moreover, no noteworthy interaction effects between the art and the negative associated values. 
As a result, this makes the sum of those values positive. Therefore, Gauguin has meaning in life. But, 
one could also just as plausibly say the reverse, namely, that while there is so much positive OV from 
the art he is engaged with, there is also a smaller but still sufficient amount of negative OV from the 
associated values to result in interaction effects that make the sum of those values negative. Therefore, 
Gaugin doesn’t have meaning in life. Suffice to say, both judgements about Gaugin can be given on the 
Revised version* despite being based on the same case information.  
25 Previous versions of this paper were presented at The College of William & Mary, the Rutgers 
Undergraduate Philosophy Reading Group, and Waseda University. I would like to thank the audiences 
of each for their input, especially John Partridge, Thaddeus Metz, Philip Swenson, and Frank Wu. I am 
most grateful to Frances Kamm, Danny Underwood, Frank Wu, and an anonymous reviewer for their 
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